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Abstract 
 
 
This project uses a quantitative approach to conduct a preliminary analysis of 
Muslim student radicalization at universities in the United State. Radicalization 
and terrorism are topics not associated with Education, and a goal of this project 
is to carve out a space for Comparative and International Education in the field of 
terrorism studies. Government and media attention have often focused on the 
role that universities play in contributing to the radicalization of Muslim students 
that go on to become terrorists. This project takes these views by outsiders and 
articulates them as a premise that argues that the university experience 
contributes to radicalization. Quantitative survey data will be used to 
operationalize radicalization using three different methods. Each of these three 
methods will be used as the dependent variable in analyses that explore the 
relationship between education and radicalization in order to refute the premise 
that higher education contributes to radicalization. 
  
 2 
 
Birthplace or Meeting Place? An Analysis of Muslim Student Radicalization in 
American Universities 
Introduction 
This thesis has three goals. The first is to explore the existing research on 
the possible connection between education, specifically higher education, and 
radicalization toward violence. The second is to use quantitative data to answer 
whether or not there is something about the higher education experience at 
Western universities that contributes to the radicalization of Muslim students. 
Finally, the third goal is to take what is learned from this and show how it can be 
useful to both educational researchers and practitioners who must unfortunately 
engage with this topic. 
Terrorism and radicalization have become problems for education because 
of the prevalence of higher education experience among terrorists (Krueger, 
2007). This results in both real problems that need to be addressed, and 
perceived problems that could result in further discrimination against Muslim 
minorities if not addressed. 
Those that participate in terrorism in the name of Islamic militantism do 
not differ significantly from their peers. Despite calls to reduce terrorism through 
international development - political, economic, and educational - most terrorists 
are not impoverished economically or politically, nor are most uneducated. In 
fact, most individuals that have participated in terrorist acts against the United 
States and the United Kingdom since 1993 have had at least some level of higher 
education participation (Krueger, 2007, 2008). Studies have even shown that not 
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only does a higher level of education correlate with terrorism, but that more 
education makes terrorists more likely to succeed in their attacks (Berrebi, 2007). 
But the problem goes beyond simple correlation. In several specific cases 
of those with higher education going on to become terrorists, certain events that 
those individuals participated in while on campus can be pointed out as possible 
contributing factors. These range from leadership positions in Muslim student 
organizations known for radical opinions to attending lectures by well-known 
figures that promote violence and terrorism. The perceived problem is that the 
environment of openness, tolerance, and diversity that is often promoted on 
Western college campuses contributes the likelihood of these events and 
indirectly causes the radicalization that leads to terrorism (Barrett, Sawer, & 
Rayment, 2010; Adam, 2010). 
Although it would be difficult to prove that this is the case, it is not an 
uncommon perception that universities inadvertently create a breeding ground 
for radicalization that leads to terrorism. This perception is present in the media, 
but also in high-level hearings on both sides of the Atlantic. With the threat of 
homegrown terrorism perceived to be on the rise in both the US and the UK, 
increased focus has been placed on possible internal sources of radicalization, 
including places of higher education (Mueller, 2005). 
It is my opinion that the environment of openness, diversity, and tolerance 
that is promoted on Western university campuses should be preserved, and that 
involvement, however well intentioned, of the national security apparatus will 
threaten it. Therefore, those involved and invested in higher education should 
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gain a greater understanding of this phenomenon to both address the real 
problem and combat false perceptions. 
This project is important, however, not only because it seeks to further the 
understanding of the connection between higher education and radicalization, 
but also because it is the first project to do so from an educational research 
perspective. Understanding, and ultimately preventing, radicalization on campus 
will further educational goals in addition to national security goals. It will help 
foster a learning environment free from those who seek to turn young Muslims 
toward terror and violence, as well as free from those who see universities as just 
another battleground in the War on Terror. 
 
Definitions 
The term “radicalization” is, in some ways, difficult to define because 
“radical” is difficult to define. The problems of definition are not simply a 
semantic issue, as they have implications for policy implementation stemming 
from this kind of research. But, for the sake of clarity, as well as to align this 
project with the larger field of terrorism studies, the definition of radicalization 
will follow along accepted lines.  
A clear articulation of radicalization as it will be used here is from 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), and they define it as, “increased preparation 
for and commitment to intergroup conflict” and “a change in beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand 
sacrifice in defense of the in-group” (p. 416).  This is compatible with another 
definition, from the Danish Ministry of Justice (Precht, 2007), which describes 
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radicalization as, “the process of adopting an extremist belief system and the 
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear as a method of effecting 
changes in society” (p. 16). 
It should also be explicitly stated that the type of radicalization and 
terrorism that is the focus of this project is the same type that has motivated the 
scrutiny of higher education’s role in terrorism: Islamic militantism. This is 
another definition that has troublesome implications, but here I mean the type of 
ideology and acts promoted and perpetrated by groups like Al Qaeda and its 
associates. There are, of course, many other types of terrorism and many ways to 
define terrorism, but this project is limited to only this one strand. 
Even though, for the purposes of this project, the accepted terrorism 
studies definition of radicalization will be used, it is important to understand the 
difficulty in defining radicalization. The difficulty stems from two different 
problems: 1) defining the process that leads one to become a radical, and 2) 
defining the end point of the process - what is a radical. Part of the problem 
stems from the desire to create general theories of radicalization that are 
applicable regardless of the particular strand of radicalism. To mitigate that 
difficulty for this project, I will focus solely on Islamist radicalization. 
With the definition of radicalization that is used for this project, it is 
important to understand the limitations and assumptions. Three assumptions 
will be discussed here. The first is the assumption that radicalization is 
prerequisite to violence/terrorism. The second is that radicalization is a gradual 
process. And finally, I will look at the assumption that radicalization is 
necessarily social. These three assumptions are present in the literature that 
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examines radicalization. These interconnected assumptions frame radicalization 
as a social process that contributes to an individual becoming a terrorist, and 
while they are essential to the definition of radicalization that will be used in this 
project, they should not go unquestioned.  
Studies in radicalization seem to assume that radicalization is a 
prerequisite to terrorism. One might argue against this by pointing to examples 
of acts of violence that look like terrorism, but are motivated by factors other than 
radicalization. Examples might include Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation or 
sectarian violence in Iraq. These arguments hinge on the definition of terrorism, 
which often is not as much about methods or targets but more about subjective 
judgments. This is the classic refrain: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.” Or, to put it more correctly, the difference between terrorism 
and asymmetrical warfare is somewhat subjective. The way out of this dilemma 
when discussing radicalization is to make the aforementioned assumption. What 
makes an act of violence interesting in terms of radicalization is the very presence 
of radicalization. So, I accept that radicalization is a necessary prerequisite to the 
type of violence I am interested in, because I am interested in the violence that 
happens as a result of radicalization.  
The second assumption is that radicalization is a process that occurs over a 
significant amount of time. Many theories of radicalization can account for a 
process as short as a few days, but all seem to agree that it cannot happen 
instantly. Even if there is a single event that serves as a trigger or is particularly 
traumatic, the pre-existing conditions that would make such an event a trigger 
are part of the process as well. Radicalization does not happen in a vacuum. Even 
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those actively and explicitly radicalizing others leverage an individual’s lifetime of 
experiences to facilitate the process. There are certainly acts of violence and 
terrorism that can be spontaneously motivated by sudden events, but those are 
not the type of actions under scrutiny here. The levels of premeditation required 
to commit large-scale acts of terror necessitate a radicalization process that 
continues all the way up to the moment of commitment. Spontaneous acts of 
violence devoid of a discernible radicalization process are simply not the focus. 
Finally, the assumption that radicalization is social is perhaps the most 
interesting to discuss, and cannot simply be accepted as part of the limited scope 
of the definition. The simplest defense for this assumption is that “radical” only 
has meaning in a social context, and therefore radicalization necessarily has a 
social component. While this seems readily apparent in the definition of the term, 
I am more concerned with the nature of the process, not the nature of the term.  
The question that gets at the heart of this assumption is: To what extent 
can one self-radicalize? Existing theories account for the self-radicalizing loner. 
These are the individuals like Ted Kazinsky and the young, isolated Muslims that 
watch Anwar Al-awlaki’s  and other pro-Jihad videos online. However, even those 
individuals are getting their ideas from others. 
But let us imagine that there is an individual who, in observing the world 
on his own, develops opinions about a particular issue that exactly mirror those 
of individuals who have been radicalized through normal, understood methods. If 
that individual is not sharing those opinions with others and thereby 
participating in a feedback loop or groupthink, or radicalizing others, or actively 
engaging in violence in the name of those ideas - then there is no practical effect 
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of that radicalization. It has no existence in the world outside of that individual’s 
mind, and therefore no consequence. Only radicalization that has manifested 
itself by becoming social actually exists in a meaningful way, and therefore it 
must be social to exist. The social component of radicalization also provides a 
pool of actions from which to draw. So even if an individual self-radicalizes 
without external input, the external world is necessary to provide examples of 
how one might act on those radical ideas. To put this another way, the externally 
manifested “outputs” of radicalization are just as important as the “inputs” that 
contribute to the radicalization of an individual.  
 
Literature Review 
The literature review for this project will reflect the three goals of this 
paper. The first part will explore existing research on and models of 
radicalization toward violence and terrorism in the form of Islamic militantism. 
The second part will provide background for analyzing available quantitative 
data. It will begin by providing a history of the connection between higher 
education and terrorism, with a focus on universities in the UK and the US. As 
there is little academic research on this specific link, this section will mostly rely 
on media reports, government committee findings, and testimony at government 
hearings. Finally, the third part of the literature review will seek to exhaust the 
remaining academic research that focuses on the links between education and 
terrorism to show that there is a lack of academic research that examines this 
important connection. This section will provide support for the third goal of this 
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paper: to carve out a place for comparative and international education within 
the larger field of terrorism studies.  
Part 1: Conceptualizing Radicalization 
Even after accepting the limited scope and definition of radicalization that 
this project focuses on, the term radicalization remains troubling because the 
object of radicalization is not clear. Are those that become radicalized toward 
terrorism victims of radicalization or participants? Much of the research on 
radicalization focuses on vulnerabilities of those radicalized, suggesting that the 
victim interpretation has some merit, but yet more research analyzes the allure of 
radical narratives and groups, suggesting that those involved are not victims but 
willing participants. 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) address this conundrum by pointing 
out that the common distinction between top-down and bottom-up (National 
Intelligence Council, 2007) radicalization is increasingly irrelevant, especially 
when it comes to the topic of this project: Muslim youth. Early adulthood is 
frequently about finding one’s identity, and this is even truer in those who 
participate in higher education where identity formation is often made an explicit 
part of the curriculum (Strayhorn, 2006; Lehigh University, 2011). Radical 
Islamist groups can provide a compelling identity to young Muslims, especially 
those who are victims of marginalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2010). In this 
way, those who become radicalized can be willing participants in that they might 
seek out radical groups on their own, but they can simultaneously be victims of 
marginalization or other influences that make radical ideas more alluring. 
Furthermore, those in radical groups are not ignorant of this (Mueller, 2005; 
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Jenkins, 2007), and they can actively tweak their messages to be more appealing 
to those seeking an identity. 
The line between agents and victims of radicalization is increasingly blurry 
and frequently non-existent, and understanding this new reality has been the 
focal point of research into radicalization for at least the past decade. Since this 
ambiguity is especially pertinent to the radicalization of Muslim youth and 
students, this brief review of the literature will also attempt to illuminate the 
concepts of radicalized individual as both victim and agent of radicalization. 
While most researchers acknowledge, like McCauley and Moskalenko, that 
the top-down/bottom-up distinction is no longer relevant, there appears to be a 
division in the aspects of radicalization that researchers choose to focus on. The 
literature on radicalization can be broken down into two main categories.  Some 
theories focus on the personal and psychological factors that contribute to 
radicalization and make particular individuals more vulnerable to radicalizing 
forces.  Pressman (2008), for example, breaks down sources of radicalization into 
macro and micro categories, but still focuses on personal psychology.  She 
acknowledges the importance of factors such as religious, national, and political 
affiliations, but categorizes them as motivating factors – things that might drive 
one to radical beliefs. 
On the other hand, other theories point to group dynamics as the source of 
radicalization.  Sunstein (2009) argues that extremist groups in general, and 
radical terrorist organizations in particular, often arise spontaneously from like-
minded individuals as a result of groupthink.  McCauley and Moskalenko’s 
(2008) theory follows the same line of thought, and they hypothesize a 12-step 
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pathway that has personal and psychological factors as only one step along the 
path to radicalization.  Everything else arises from meeting, or even simply being 
around, like-minded peers. 
Stern (2010) takes the significance of groups even further and argues that 
some individuals become radicalized and tightly integrated into radical groups 
prior to fully realizing the extent or significance of the particular radical ideas.  
These groups can provide valuable social support to individuals who are 
otherwise socially vulnerable.  Some individuals can even get enough benefit 
from belonging to the group that it outweighs what would normally be significant 
personal costs of believing radical ideas. 
Much recent literature on terrorists seeks to disprove the commonly held 
idea that terrorists are members of traditionally vulnerable populations, such as 
the poor or the uneducated (Bergen & Pandey, 2005; Berrebi, 2007; Krueger, 
2008; Krueger, 2007).  This would seem to cast doubt on Stern’s theory of radical 
groups providing necessary social support to vulnerable individuals.  However, 
since youth are typically targets of radicalization, it is important to be aware that 
young people, particularly college-aged students, can be socially vulnerable even 
if they are educated and wealthy. 
Although much effort has gone into analyzing the psychological factors 
conducive to radicalization and terrorism, and this project acknowledges that 
there are important factors particular to Muslim youth and students that may 
make them more vulnerable, it should be remembered that these factors are not 
indicative of some abnormality. Psychologist Gerald Post emphasizes that 
terrorists do not tend to suffer from psychotic disorders, and are more or less 
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“normal.” (Post, 2007). This is corroborated by Horgan, who argues that one 
cannot distinguish between terrorists and the general population nor use 
psychological traits as predictors (Horgan, 2008). Post even suggests that 
terrorists groups actively screen out would-be terrorists who present symptoms 
of emotional distress, as they might pose a risk to the group or operation. 
Post does provide an individual psychological framework to differentiate 
types of terrorism based on differing motivations. An example of this framework 
that is relevant both to the type of terrorism at hand and the population I am 
concerned with - students - focuses on the youth’s relationship to his parents. 
According to Post, youths who are rebellious, or, in his terms, disloyal to their 
parents, are more likely to engage in action against the regime that those parents 
support. Therefore, if a student is disloyal to parents who are loyal to the regime, 
then that student will focus his energies against the regime. Post calls this, “social 
revolutionary terrorism.” In the context of this project, this would be manifested 
in the following way: a Muslim student attends a Western university where, for 
various reasons, he clings more tightly to his Muslim identity and becomes 
increasingly devout. If his parents were more secular, this turn toward more 
traditional Islam is a way to rebel against them while simultaneously responding 
to the pressures of being a minority student. The regime that his parents are loyal 
to, which in this case could simply be a Western-focused secular/modernist 
outlook, then becomes the target of his ire.  
Although the “social revolutionary” moniker that Post has attached to this 
outlook readily applies to leftist youth and student movements of the Cold War 
decades, it applies equally well to Islamist/jihadist movements. By looking at the 
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rhetoric of the movements’ propagandists, they seek a social revolution. 
According to French researcher Olivier Roy, the form and function of what Post 
called social revolutionary terrorism is present in both radical leftist movements 
of the 60s and in contemporary Jihadist movements (Roy, 2011). Roy even goes 
as far as to assert that many of the same individuals that find themselves in 
Jihadist terrorist groups today, would have instead been in radical 
socialist/nationalist movements if they had been born in a different time. In 
other words, Roy, like Post, argues that terrorists become radicalized not because 
of the allure of the extremist message itself, but because extremism gives them an 
outlet for their rebellion and access to like-minded rebels. It should be no 
surprise, then, that terrorists are usually young, male, and estranged from their 
families. These are all familiar signs of rebellious youth. 
Although Post argues that individual psychology cannot be used to explain 
terrorism, he asserts psychology does matter, but that it is group psychology, not 
individual psychology that is at work. This is especially important when 
considering student radicalization. The individuals involved may be more or less 
normal students suffering from the same problems as the general student 
population, but the groups to which they frequently retreat suffer from a 
collective psychopathy that is more conducive to terrorism than others. “As 
observed, terrorists are not depressed, severely emotionally disturbed, or crazed 
fanatics. It is not individual psychopathology, but group, organizational, and 
social psychology, with a particular emphasis on "collective identity," that 
provides the most powerful lens through which to understand terrorist 
psychology and behavior.” (Post, 2007) 
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This collective identity is reflected in the data as well. In Sageman’s 
analysis of terrorist demographics, he noted that there seemed to be few 
commonalities among terrorists selected: gender and age being the most notable 
(Sageman, 2008). However, Sageman’s analysis included terrorists from a wide 
range of movements: from IRA bombers to 9/11 hijackers. In an earlier analysis 
by Bakker of only Islamist terrorists in Europe, he noted that while it is true that 
terrorists, even within the same movement, tend to have a wide range of 
characteristics, members within terrorist groups tended to be similar. In other 
words, terrorist organizations bring together individuals with similar 
circumstances, reinforcing Post’s argument about the importance of collective 
identity. 
 Connecting to student radicalization. How are students in particular 
vulnerable to terrorist radicalization? As mentioned previously, both terrorist 
organizations and their potential pool of recruits are engaged in a continuous 
push and pull of persuasion and marketing. The organizations actively tweak 
their messages and narratives to appeal to as many as possible, and the recruits 
frequently seek out such messages to find comfort or outlets for aggression. The 
most significant comfort and outlet that terrorist organizations can provide is 
through identity formation, and this is why Muslim students and youth are the 
most susceptible. 
Rand researcher B.M. Jenkins has pointed out the persuasive power 
radicalization via offers of identity formation: 
The more vulnerable are those who are at a stage of life where they are 
seeking an identity, while looking for approval and validation. They are 
  
 15 
searching for causes that can be religiously and culturally justified, that 
provide them a way to identify who they are, and that provide a clear call 
for action. (Jenkins, 2007) 
Although he was not speaking specifically about students, those close to 
higher education understand that identity formation is a key element of the 
university experience. Not only is “finding yourself” what college is commonly 
thought to be about, but identity development is frequently an explicit aspect of 
curriculum design (Strayhorn, 2006; Lehigh University, 2011). 
Furthermore, in American and British universities, many of the Islamic 
youth are international students. So not only are they experiencing all the trials of 
youth, they are doing so as an immigrant minority. Jenkins cites many of the 
difficulties that students such as these face - “disruptive relocation, identity 
crises,… uncertain futures,… alienation” when highlighting potential 
vulnerabilities that might make someone more susceptible to radicalization 
(Jenkins, 2007). 
Jenkins’ argument may be compelling, but not all of the literature agrees 
completely. While the bulk of the research confirms that much of the allure of 
radicalization is through identify formation for those youth seeking meaning and 
purpose, many researchers disagree that it is about “searching for causes that can 
be religious and culturally justified.” In fact, it could be quite the opposite. 
Roy, in comparing contemporary jihadists to Leftist radicals of the 60s and 
70s, notes that unlike the terrorists of the IRA, the Tamil Tigers, or other non-
Islamist terrorist causes, radicalization toward terrorism in the name of Islamist 
jihad does not “run in the family.” Contemporary Muslim youth who are finding 
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identity in the messages of Al-Qaeda are not just fighting for something, but they 
are also rebelling against something: Western hegemony, secularism, etc. And in 
most cases, they are rebelling against their parents and other authority figures 
with whom they grew up (Roy, 2005). 
 Modeling radicalization. A method for examining radicalization used 
later in this project will draw heavily from the work of Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman (2009) whose study analyzed 117 homegrown terrorists in the US. By 
looking at qualitative and quantitative data for these individuals, Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman determined, 
…Six specific behavioral manifestations of the radicalization process: the 
adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only a 
select and ideologically rigid group of religious authorities, viewing the 
West and Islam as irreconcilably opposed, manifesting a low tolerance for 
perceived religious deviance, attempting to impose religious beliefs on 
others, and the expression of radical political views.  
 
The model that they developed is the first (and only) of its kind. Faced 
with the same difficulties documented previously regarding pinning down 
commonalities among terrorists, they went beyond simple demographic profiling 
and looked at how 117 actual terrorists radicalized and what manifestations 
developed along the way. Their methodology involved pouring over interview 
transcripts, court documents, media reports, writings, and even conducting their 
own interviews to delve into the history of each of their 117 selected terrorists. 
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The path from radicalization to recruitment to terrorist was reconstructed and 
evaluated as to how strongly each of these manifestations was present. 
They find, like others have, that demographic commonalities are 
insignificant and/or nonexistent. But the six manifestations they pulled out from 
their sample are present to some extent in all 117 terrorists. In commenting on 
Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman’s work, Jenkins points out that this is the first 
model of its kind, and it has significant implications for understanding the 
radicalization process. He warns, however, that it should not be used to “profile” 
individuals as terrorists simply because they exhibit any number of these 
manifestations, as even then it would be extremely unlikely that they would 
actually commit a terrorist act. Instead, their work should be used to understand 
radicalization and evaluate policy and research. And that is exactly how it will be 
used in this project. 
Part 2: Applying Radicalization Theory to Education 
Researchers and policymakers in the UK (and Europe) have been quicker 
to focus their gaze on student radicalization than their counterparts in the US. 
The UK’s close support for the United States in the War on Terror, and the 
intelligence community component of this, meant that government agencies and 
politicians alike scrutinized possible sites of terrorist recruitment and 
radicalization. In addition to traditional targets of this scrutiny - Mosques and 
prisons - universities became suspect as well (Neumann, 2008; Mueller, 2005; 
Moniquet, 2005). Media reports frequently called British universities “hotbeds” 
and “recruiting grounds” (Adam, 2010; Slack, 2011; Brant, 2011). All of this 
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resulted in investigations, both before and after Christmas Day 2009, of potential 
radicalization and recruitment on university campuses. 
These investigations became controversial. Opponents of turning the 
intelligence community’s eyes on universities made allegations of racial profiling 
and Islamophobia (Satter, 2010). Supporters of the investigations accused 
university administrators of stalling, either out of a sense of political correctness, 
or in order to take the spotlight away from a student population that is an 
important source of funding (Thorne & Stuart, 2007). However, despite the 
controversy, there were, and continue to be, no thorough evaluations of the 
premise behind all of this: that universities are indeed conducive to terrorist 
radicalization. 
Terrorist theory, legal realities, and empirical evidence show that 
radicalization is a separate phenomenon from recruitment (Sageman, 2008; 
Pressman, 2008; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2009). While they are 
intimately related, it is important to keep them separate. There are three main 
reasons for this. First, by keeping radicalization separate, participation in a 
terrorist organization or committing a terrorist act can be criminalized without 
criminalizing the desire to commit such an act. 
Secondly, if researchers and the terrorist community seek to 
operationalize what can be learned from investigations into radicalization and 
recruitment at universities, they need to understand that there is significant 
conceptual space between being a radical and being a terrorist, or even a terrorist 
supporter. This is especially true on university campuses. Even if one’s goal is not 
to perpetuate an environment conducive to radicalism of all kinds, which is 
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typical on campus, it is important to not be overly aggressive in pursuit of 
radicals for fear of driving those who pose a true danger even further 
underground. 
Finally, and most importantly for this project, separating radicalization 
from terrorist activity exposes flaw in the logic of those who assert the premise 
that university campuses are conducive to radicalization. Their evidence of this is 
that most terrorists have some level of tertiary education. But when radicalization 
and recruitment are analyzed as separate concepts, then it does not necessary 
follow that because there are higher rates of college-educated terrorists, that 
there are higher rates of radicalization among those with college experience. 
There are many other possible factors that could account for the increased 
education levels of terrorists, some of which will be discussed later. Separating 
radicalization from recruitment also provides a way to test the premise that 
underlies the assertion that universities are conducive to radicalization. 
Attempting to test this premise will make up the bulk of this project. 
Part 3: An Educational Perspective 
The focus of current policy discussions seems to be centered on the UK 
and Europe, even in the United States.  More extensive terrorist networks, more 
embedded forces of radicalization, and the larger number of Muslims in the UK 
and Europe make it central to security efforts of both European and American 
interests (Moniquet, 2005). Many of the recommendations for national-level 
policy to combat the radicalization of Muslim students are part of larger anti-
radicalization strategies and not specific to the unique situation of student 
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radicalization.  In fact, there is a lack of national policy focus to deal with 
students specifically.  
Currently, university administrators have a large amount of authority but 
no clear guidelines on how to handle suspected cases of radicalization.  They 
must contend with conflicting political agendas, free speech and civil rights 
issues, pressure from local organizations and law enforcement, and financial 
considerations even when faced with clear evidence of radicalizing figures, 
organizations, or other influences.  In a highly influential and damning report of 
higher education leaders in the UK, Anthony Glees and Chris Pope (2005) 
pointed to the difficulty in navigating these complex issues as a reason why it is 
frequently the choice of administrators to do nothing at all. 
Glees and Pope argued that university heads would hide behind claims of 
freedom of speech and religion to justify inaction.  But that, in reality, these 
leaders have been operating under the assumption that the radicalizing 
influences in question would go away on their own (since individual students are 
only around for 3-4 years), and thus were not worth the risk of lawsuits and 
possible alienation of a financially lucrative pool of potential international 
applicants.   
This study, and other investigations (Barrett,et al., 2010; Temple-Raston, 
2010) also point to the influence money can have, by revealing that many Islamic 
student societies in the UK receive funding from outside “Arab and Muslim 
investors” (Barrett, et al., 2010).  According to their investigations, higher 
education institutions in the UK have received £260 million in donations from 
such investors since 2000, with little review of their sources or oversight of the 
  
 21 
use of the funds.  However, in the Glees and Pope report, the only suggestion 
regarding this funding is to increase regulation, but this recommendations does 
not provide additional details on how to determine which funding should be 
accepted or how it should be used (2005). 
The most salient recommendation to come out of this report was the 
establishment of close ties between immigration departments and university 
registrars, which is exactly what the Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System (SEVIS) does in the United States.  However, this does nothing if the 
student in question is a British citizen.  Other recommendations range from the 
impossibly vague (“exclude dangerous students,” p. 97-98) to the Orwellian 
(“establish comprehensive lists of all student societies to check membership, 
aims, and objectives and provide monitoring of activities,” p. 97-98). 
Glees and Pope acknowledge, as does the Dutch Ministry of the Interior 
(2004) and the Danish Ministry of Justice (Precht, 2007), the role that the 
university can play in anti-radicalization and even de-radicalization by promoting 
ideals that should be present in abundance at a Western university: tolerance, 
diversity, liberalism.  But they insist that this should be actively done, because it 
is clear that simply being in the presence of such ideals does not encourage one to 
internalize them. 
 In an early paper on the subject of politically motivated student violence, 
following the Kent State shootings, Adamek and Lewis (1973), already rejected 
the idea that different socioeconomic or psychological factors contribute to 
radicalization. Instead, they argue that being subjected to, or witnessing others 
being subjected to, social control was the key factor in creating attitudes that 
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were favorable toward political violence. This is an important finding to consider 
before proposing responses to student activism, especially before involving law 
enforcement or the national security apparatus. In light of Oliver Roy’s argument 
that the mechanisms that drive youth to Islamist radicalism are the same that 
drove youth to radical Leftism, and even that the audience is largely the same, the 
applicability of Adamek and Lewis’ study of the Kent State case is made even 
more clear.  
Even though a large number of Muslim students in the United States and 
the UK were born in those countries, attending college can add another layer of 
perceived isolation and loneliness in addition to that of being an ethnic minority.  
But the majority of Western-educated terrorists attended Western universities as 
international students, and they faced yet an even deeper layer of social isolation.  
The effects of studying abroad on social connections (Weiley, Sommers, & Bryce, 
2008; Trice, 2007) and personal mental health (Sawir, Marginson, Deumert, 
Nyland, & Ramia, 2008; Black, Mendenhall, & Oddou 1991; Robertson, Line, 
Jones, & Thomas, 2000) are well documented.  However, there is no research on 
the likely connection between the hardships of international students and 
participation in radical student groups. It is, however, well understand that there 
is a desire among troubled international students to self-segregate (Trice, 2007), 
and for many Muslims, the most visible and active student groups that will 
appear welcoming to them are those that have a higher chance of promoting 
radical beliefs. 
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Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative section of this project will focus on radicalization and the 
prevalence of radical beliefs among Muslims in the US and the UK, with a focus 
on the effect of higher education participation. The qualitative analysis will look 
primarily at how this radicalization happens and how this leads to recruitment 
into terrorist organizations or participation in terrorism in general. These are 
both essential to understanding the journey one takes to becoming a terrorist, but 
an emphasis will be placed on how higher education intersects with this journey. 
I use publicly available datasets to evaluate the prevalence of radical 
beliefs among Muslims in the United States and the United Kingdom and analyze 
the effect, if any, of higher education participation. This is important because it 
allows me to test the validity of the premise that higher education participation 
contributes to radicalization, which has been the focus of both media and 
government attention. By testing this, it gives insight into what role higher 
education plays at the radicalization stage. 
The Pew Research Center (2007) provides the most comprehensive 
research in this area.  Their report on Muslims in America has a wealth of 
descriptive statistics on the characteristics of Muslims in America and how they 
compare to Muslims in other countries, including the UK. While a significant 
amount of data is available for the United States, comparable raw data is not 
available for the UK. While the data analysis in this section will focus on the US, 
there is significant evidence that the results can be generalized to at least the UK. 
Where available, secondary reports from the UK will be used to corroborate 
findings from the US. 
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Method 
The bulk of the quantitative analysis for this project will rely on the data 
from the Pew Research Center’s Muslims in America survey (2007). First, there 
will be an analysis of the descriptive statistics, both to put the data into the 
context of hypothesis and purpose of this project and also to benefit from the 
work of Krueger who has worked with this data as well. 
Secondly, I will begin my own analysis of the data. The ultimate goal of my 
analysis is to examine the connection between education and radicalization, and 
while the survey provides excellent data on the education of the Muslim 
respondents, that is only half of the picture. The survey does not and cannot 
meaningfully measure radicalization directly, so I must use a variety of methods 
to tease out this latent variable. 
The methods I use differ primarily by the dependent variable involved. 
The first method is the most direct, and I use a single item in the survey - one that 
asks for the respondents’ level of support for religious violence - as my dependent 
variable. The second method is directly related to the Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman model of behavioral manifestations of radicalization. I pick out items 
in the survey that reflect one or more of the six types of manifestations and then 
total them to create a single “score” of radicalization. As there is no precedent for 
this type of analysis, the selection method is as robust as possible in order to 
include as many component variables as possible. For example, the “marry” 
variable, which measures whether or not the respondent believes that Muslims 
should be allowed to marry non-Muslims, could be included based on it being a 
manifestation of what Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman call, “A Legalistic 
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Interpretation of Islam.” Such selections were made entirely at my discretion, 
based on a careful and informed reading of Gatenstein-Ross & Grossman and the 
Pew Research Center methodology and the resulting choices are available in 
Appendix A. While the second method is directly based on the work of 
Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, the third method is only loosely based. This 
method uses factor analysis to find variables that related in a way that indicates 
the presence of a latent variable. The content of each factor will be explored, and 
the factor deemed most closely and relevantly related to radicalization will be 
used as a dependent variable. 
The result of these analyses will be three dependent variables that reflect 
three different ways of measuring radicalization based on the same set of data. 
This is not done to compare and contrast the methods, although that would be an 
interesting tangent, but instead this is a way of providing thoroughness to the 
overall quantitative analysis. 
In addition to the three different methods for creating proxy variables for 
the concept of radicalization, three primary independent variables will be used. 
The first is educational attainment level, as reported by respondents to the Pew 
survey. A frequency table of responses to this question is presented in Table 1 
below. The second variable is enrollment status – whether or not each individual 
is current (at the time of the survey) enrolled in a higher education institution. 
Responses to this will be presented in Table 2 below. Finally, the third variable is 
age, and distribution information for this variable will be presented in Table 3 
below.  
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Table 1: What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 
None 30 2.9 
Highschool incomplete 53 5.1 
Highschool graduate 198 19.2 
technical 
college/vocational school 22 2.1 
some college (4 yr) 200 19.4 
college graduate (4 yr) 280 27.2 
post-graduate 248 24.1 
Total 1031 100.0 
Missing System 19  
Total 1050  
 
 
Table 2: Are you currently enrolled in a college or university class? 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 
Yes 205 19.5 
No 843 80.3 
(VOL) Don't know/refused 2 .2 
Total 1050 100.0 
 
 
Other important independent variables that might have been chosen for 
analysis, but were not, are gender and a measure of socio-economic status. 
Gender was excluded from this analysis because, while Islamist terrorists are 
almost entirely male, this project is explicitly focused on a prerequisite of actual 
terrorist action. Not only is gender outside of the scope of this project, accounting 
for it by performing separate analyses (or removing females entirely) would bias 
the results by excluding a group known to not to participate in terrorism 
regardless of prerequisites such as radicalization and/or extremist views. While I 
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acknowledge that there are reasonable grounds for focusing solely on male 
Muslim youth in similar or future analyses of this type, I chose not to do so for 
these reasons. As for the decision to not include a variable for socio-economic 
status, this was informed by the work of Berrebi (2007), Sageman (2008), and 
Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009), among others, whose analyses showed 
that rates of terrorism cannot be predicted by socio-economic status. 
Furthermore, while gender and citizenship were included as control variables, the 
income data available from the 2007 Pew survey is of poor quality and a 
preliminary analysis showed that it did not account for a significant amount of 
noise.  
Although many projects have sought to quantify and/or profile terrorists 
and likely terrorists, there is no precedent for using the Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman model in this way, nor is there a precedent for attempting to measure 
radicalization and attitudes using survey data. By using three separate methods, I 
hope to “cover my bases” and provide useful findings while simultaneously 
charting new territory. The exact outcomes will, of course, differ, but it is 
expected that each method will show the same basic results for the test of the 
premise. Ideally, this will not only provide some insight into the content of the 
research question, but it will also speak somewhat to the validity of these 
methods. 
Descriptive Analysis 
The Pew study of Muslims in America asks this question that is most 
directly relevant to this project: 
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Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence 
against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies.  
Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is 
never justified.  Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified 
to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified? (p. 91) 
 
Although in the report, responses to this question are abbreviated as 
support for suicide bombing, the text of the question encompasses all violent, 
terrorist acts that might be committed to in order to promote or defend the 
Islamic cause. American Muslims of roughly college age (18-29) were reported to 
have any amount of support for violence/suicide bombing (rarely, sometimes, or 
often justified) at a rate of 26%.  In the UK, the rate was 35%.  For the general 
population, American Muslims supported this type of violence at a rate of 13%.  
In the UK, the rate was 24%. 
What is learned from these numbers is that, Muslim youth (regardless of 
education), have a higher rate of radicalization (i.e. any support for violence) than 
the general Muslim population in both the United States and the UK.  It is also 
learned that radicalization, among both youth and the general population, is 
more pronounced in the UK than the United States.  The most significant 
difference is between the general populations of each country, where Muslims in 
the UK are twice as likely to have radical views regarding violence in the name of 
Islam.  This is reflected in the increased rate of radicalization among Muslim 
youth in the UK when compared to the United States. 
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Krueger (2008) has taken the Pew Research Center’s data and compared it 
to a compiled list of 63 alleged Islamic terrorists in the United States.  His 
findings add an extra layer to Pew’s data, and show that his 63 terrorists are 
significantly more educated than the average Muslim in the United States.  
Almost 80% of the alleged terrorists had some college education, compared to 
fewer than 50% of all Muslims in the United States.  Based on his small sample, 
each additional year of education increases the likelihood of being charged as a 
terrorist by 4%. 
The most interesting finding to come out of Krueger’s research is that, of 
his 63 alleged terrorists, those with higher educational attainment were 
significantly more likely to be more successful in their terrorist acts.  Although 
Krueger’s U.S. study has a small sample size, the results showing a positive 
correlation between education and a desire to commit terrorist acts, as well as 
between education and “operational success,” are consistent with findings from a 
study of Palestinian suicide bombers (Berrebi, 2007) and members of the Jewish 
Underground (Krueger & Maleèkova, 2003). 
Primary Analysis – Dependent Variable Methods 
 Method 1. The first DVs that will be used for the analysis are pulled 
directly from the PRC survey questions. The relevant questions ask, 
Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence 
against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its 
enemies.  Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind 
of violence is never justified.  Do you personally feel that this kind of 
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violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely 
justified, or never justified? (p. 91) 
 
And: 
Overall, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Al Qaeda? 
 
For the purposes of this project, these questions were changed to vary in 
the same direction. For the first question, the valid responses were recoded as, 
“often justified” (4), “sometimes justified” (3), “rarely justified” (2), and “never 
justified” (1). Similarly, for the second question, the responses were, “very 
favorable” (4), “somewhat favorable” (3), “somewhat unfavorable” (2), and “very 
unfavorable” (1). Those individuals who refused to answer the questions were 
omitted from further analyses, and this was 6.4% of respondents for the support 
for violence question and 21.8% of respondents for the opinion of Al-Qaeda 
question. It is significant that over a fifth of participants chose not to respond to 
this question - more than any other question in the survey. This is also part of the 
reason why these two questions do not correlate significantly as expected, and 
why thy will be used separately in the analyses to come. 
The following tables show the frequency of each response for both the 
support for violence question (Table 3) and support for Al-Qaeda question (Table 
4). 
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Table 3 - Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is justified to defend 
Islam? 
 
 Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Valid 
Never Justified 862 87.7 
Rarely Justified 42 4.0.3 
Sometimes Justified 60 6.1 
Often Justified 19 1.9 
Total 983 100.0 
Missing System 67  
Total 1050  
 
Table 4 - Overall, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Al Qaeda? 
 Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Valid 
Very favorable 7 .7 
Somewhat favorable 26 2.5 
Somewhat unfavorable 81 7.7 
Very unfavorable 707 67.3 
(VOL) Don't know/refused 229 21.8 
Total 1050 100.0 
 
 
 Method 2. The second dependent variable is based on the Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman model of behavioral manifestations of radicalization. I chose 22 
items in the survey that reflected one or more of the six types of manifestations 
that they highlight in their work, and recoded them into dichotomous variables. A 
value of 0 indicates that the response does not show a behavioral manifestation, 
while a value of 1 indicates that it does. The responses were then totaled to create 
a single “score” of radicalization, which is later referred to as the GRG Index 
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Score. The complete list of variables used as well as the corresponding responses 
can be found in Appendix A. 
Out of a maximum score of 22, the highest score among the respondents 
was 20 and the lowest was 0. The mean score was 8.48, SD=3.57, V=12.75. The 
resulting score will serve as a dependent variable in the analyses to follow. 
 Method 3. The final dependent variable will come from exploratory 
factor analysis using the principal components extraction method. This will allow 
for a statistical way to see what variables are related, and if they represent a latent 
variable that might be more accurately used as a proxy variable to measure 
radicalization. Using a slightly reduced set of items based on the Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman model (available in Table 5 below), I performed principal 
component analysis to arrive at three different factors.  
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Table 5 – Pew 2007 variables sorted by closest relevant Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman (2009) manifestation of radicalization 
 
 
The Principal Component Analysis method was chosen as a form of 
exploratory factor analysis to determine, what, if any, hidden variables might lie 
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QB2d	  (sexuality)	  	   QD2	  (Muslim	  friends)	   QC1	  (Afghanistan	  invasion)	   QE3	  (importance	  of	  religion)	  
QE8	  (Mosques	  in	  politics)	   QF1	  (concerned	  about	  extremism)	  
QE1	  (Mosque)	  frequency)	   	   QC2	  (Iraq	  invasion)	  	   QE9	  (one	  interpretation	  of	  Islam)	  
QG1	  (female	  quality	  of	  life)	   QH1	  (religious	  violence)	  
QE4	  (Koran	  is	  word	  of	  god)	  
	   QD4	  (conflict	  with	  modernity)	  
QD7	  (intermarriage)	   	   QH4	  (War	  on	  Terror)	  
QE5	  (Koran	  is	  literal)	   	   QD5	  (American	  customs)	   	   	   QH4a	  (Israeli	  coexistence)	  
QE6	  (prayer	  frequency)	   	   QE12	  (1st	  identity)	   	   	   QH5	  (opinion	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda)	  
QG3	  (females	  in	  Mosque)	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beneath the variables provided in the Pew survey. I was hoping that the analysis 
might show that by choosing conceptually similar (according to the Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman model) variables, they might load onto the resulting factors in 
such a way as to reflect the same conceptual categories. Although they did not 
map exactly onto the Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman manifestations of 
radicalization, the resulting factors do contain component variables that bear 
some conceptual similarities. Again, for full information about each of the 
component factors, see Appendix A. 
 The analysis was performed using a factor-based dimension reduction 
analysis in SPSS 20 for Mac OS X, using the principal components method to 
extract 3 factors. A direct oblimin rotation was chosen over other rotation 
methods for this principal component analysis because the resulting factors and 
loadings better fit the conceptual aspects of the data, and because this rotation 
provided significantly more components for factor 3 than other rotations. 
Preliminary analyses allowed for other possible rotations to be used (Field, 
2009), but a promax rotation only had 4 components loaded onto factor 3. As two 
of these were the same variables used in the first method, this would not provide 
much of a statistical difference despite the drastic differences in methodology. 
  The following table (Table 6) shows the three factors as well as the 
variables that load onto each. 
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Table 6 – Principal Component Analysis Results with Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman (2009) variables loaded onto 3 extracted factors. 
 
 Component 
1 2 3 
xFAqe6 salah .814     
xFAqe3 religious importance .755     
xFAqe1 mosque freq .739     
xFAqe12 1st identity .605     
xFAqe2 mosque activites .576 .334   
xFAqb2d sexuality .510     
xFAqd2 friends .447     
xFAqg3 females in mosques .312     
xFAqc2 invasion afghan   .731   
xFAqh4 WoT sincerity   .727   
xFAqc1 invasion iraq   .611 .354 
xFAqe9 one interpretation   -.406   
xFAqh5 AQ support     .653 
xFAqh4a Israel     .627 
xFAqd4 modernity     .533 
xFAqd7 marry     .410 
xFAqh1 violence     .403 
xFAqd5 adapt     .389 
xFAqg1 females       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
 
The first factor can be interpreted to represent a latent religiosity variable. 
The second factor represents attitudes toward the United States’ actions in the 
War on Terror. The third factor contains a wider variety of items than the other 
factors, but it can be interpreted as a combination of two important 
manifestations from the Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman model: 1) Perceived 
Schism Between Islam and the West and 2) Political Radicalization (p. 13). 
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Variables such as “adapt,” “marry,” “modernity,” and “females” (for full 
description, see Appendix A), show a respondent’s rejection of Western values 
regarding integration, mixed marriage, and gender equality. Combined with 
support for the anti-Western agenda of Al-Qaeda (“AQ support”) and rejection of 
Palestinian coexistence with Israel (“Israel”), these variables show both politically 
radical attitudes and the perception of fundamental divides between Islam and 
the West. 
While Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman believe that all six manifestations are 
exhibited in most examples of radicalization, these seem to be the most extreme. 
This factor is also the one that most closely aligns with their established model of 
radicalization. Finally, this factor contains both the support for violence variable 
as well as the opinion of Al-Qaeda variable. For these reasons, this factor will be 
the one used for the final dependent variable. 
 
Premises & IVs 
Now that the dependent variables have been established, here, again, are 
the premises that will be tested. 
P1: The environment at institutions of higher education contributes to the 
radicalization of Muslim youth. 
If P1 is to hold, then one or both of the following must be true: 
P1a) Muslims with higher education degrees will hold beliefs indicative of 
radicalization at a higher rate than non-college educated Muslims. 
OR 
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P1b) Muslims enrolled in higher education will hold beliefs indicative of 
radicalization at a higher rate than college-aged Muslims who are not in 
college. 
Beliefs indicative of radicalization are measured using the three methods 
covered previously. The same 2007 Pew Research Center study also provides data 
that can be used to evaluate these premises. Each respondent was asked about 
educational achievement level, current higher education enrollment status, and 
age. These will be the independent variables for each of the analyses to follow. 
Results 
Method 1: Ordinal Logistic Regression 
Using ordinal logistic regression, a non-parametric equivalent of linear 
regression, I tested the effect of age, educational achievement, and current 
enrollment status in higher education against the proxy variables for 
radicalization. In this case, that variable was a measurement of support for 
violence in the name of religion, and a measurement of support for Al-Qaeda. If 
the stated premise was to hold, then the result would show a positive correlation 
between educational achievement and support for violence, or a positive 
correlation between those enrolled in higher education and support for violence. 
My tests did not show this to be the case. Using ordinal logistic regression 
I found that there was no significant effect of current college enrollment status on 
support for religious violence. I found a negative relationship between 
educational attainment and support for violence. For a one unit increase in 
education level, the expected ordered log odds decreases by -.193 (p = .001) as 
you move to the next higher category of support for violence. I also found a 
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negative relationship between age and support for violence. For a one year 
increase in age, the expected ordered log odds decreases by -.039 (p < .001) as 
you move to the next higher category of support for violence. 
There’s a similar picture for opinion of Al-Qaeda. I found that there was no 
significant effect of current college enrollment status on opinion of Al-Qaeda. I 
found a negative relationship between educational attainment and opinion of Al-
Qaeda. For a one unit increase in education level, the expected ordered log odds 
decreases by -.326 (p = .001) as you move to the next higher category of opinion 
of Al-Qaeda. I also found a negative relationship between age and opinion of Al-
Qaeda. For a one year increase in age, the expected ordered log odds decreases by 
-.022 (p < .001) as you move to the next higher category of support for violence. 
A Mann-Whitney Test, a non-parametric equivalent of the t-test, confirms 
that there is no significant difference between those enrolled in higher education 
and those not enrolled when it comes to support for violence (p = 0.053) or 
opinion of Al-Qaeda (p=0.86).  
In other words, college enrollment has no effect on extremism, and higher 
levels of education make one less likely to hold extremist views. However, youth 
and extremism were related. To show this more clearly, 26% of Muslims surveyed 
between the ages 18 and 29 (roughly college age) support violence at some level, 
compared to 13% of the general Muslim population and 16% of those enrolled in 
tertiary education. This data shows that holding extremist beliefs is a function of 
youth, not tertiary education. Both P1a and P1b fail, and the premise does not 
hold. 
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Method 2: Regression on Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman Index Score 
Dependent Variable 
Based on the work of Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, a set of 19 variables 
from the Pew Research Center report on Muslims in America (2006) were 
selected for a factor analysis. Each of the 19 variables selected corresponds to one 
of the six behavioral manifestations of radicalization that Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman found to be significant in their population of 117 homegrown terrorists 
in the US. These variables, and the manifestation-type they most closely 
resembled, are presented in Table 1 above. 
With the GRG index score as a second dependent variable method, I can 
now perform parametric tests such as linear regression. Depending on the 
strength of the primary independent variables in predicting this score, 
enrollment status and educational attainment, this method can be used to 
determine whether or not the premises hold. The results of multiple linear 
regression with the relevant variables (enrollment status, age, and educational 
attainment) is presented below. 
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Table 7 - Regression Table for 2nd DV – Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman Index 
Score, a proxy variable for radicalization using Method 2 to generate a dependent 
variable. 
  
B 
 
Std. Error 
 
Β 
 
t 
 
Sig. 
 
Part. 
Constant 10.79 .019  554.39 .001  
Enrollment .128 .008 .016 16.59 .001 .015 
Age -.039 .000 -.151 -160.31 .001 -.142 
Educ. Attainment -.410 .002 -.202 -225.03 .001 -.199 
*Control variable for gender and citizenship not shown. 
While statistically significant, enrollment was not a strong predictor of 
GRG score, B = .128, t(1017) = 16.59, p < .001, and only accounted for 1.5% of the 
total variability. However, both age, B = -.039, t(1017) = -160.31, p < .001, and 
educational attainment, B = -.410, t(1017) = -225.03, p < .001, were significant 
predictors of the GRG score of radicalization. A higher level of educational 
attainment or a higher age predict lower levels of GRG radicalization score. 
Combined, they account for over a third of the variance in the GRG score. 
Method 3: Regression Using Extracted Factor from Gartenstein-Ross  
& Grossman Analysis via Principal Component Analysis  
For the final dependent variable method, factor analysis was chosen for its 
ability to reduce a large number of variables into just a few factors while retaining 
statistical information. Because of the 19 variables that matched one or more of 
Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman’s behavioral manifestations of radicalization, and 
the varied nature of those variables, factor analysis is a suitable and sound 
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method for compressing that data into a more manageable set of factors. 
Furthermore, while these factors will be useful for further analyses, they also 
provide an evaluation of how well Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman’s model maps 
onto a real population. 
Using factor 3 from the previous factor analysis, I have another continuous 
variable that can be used as the dependent variable in standard linear regression. 
 
Table 8 - Regression Table for 3rd DV – Principal Component Analysis, Factor 3: 
A proxy variable for radicalization using Method 3 to generate a dependent 
variable 
  
B 
 
Std. Error 
 
β 
 
t 
 
Sig. 
 
Part. 
Constant 1.042 .007  139.58 .001  
Enrollment .045 .003 .021 15.09 .001 .019 
Age -.008 .000 -.114 -82.53 .001 -.104 
Educ. Attainment -.284 .001 -.461 --356.65 .001 -.451 
*Control variable for gender and citizenship not shown. 
Again, like the GRG score, enrollment status significant but not a strong 
predictor of Factor 3, B = .045, t(437) = .15.09, p < .001. But both age, B = -.008, 
t(437) = -82.53, p < 0.001, and educational attainment, B = -.284, t(437) = -
356.65, p < .001, again show a significant negative relationship to the dependent 
variable. A higher level of educational attainment or a higher age predicts lower 
levels of the Factor 3 latent variable. Combined, they account for over half of the 
variance in Factor 3. 
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Regardless of the methods used to derive the dependent variable, all 
analyses point to the same conclusion. There is a significant negative relationship 
between both age and educational attainment and radicalization. As individuals 
get older or become more educated, their rates of radicalization decrease. 
Enrollment status at time of survey has no significant relationship to 
radicalization rates. 
To revisit this in terms of the original sub-premises: 
P1a) Muslims with higher education degrees will hold beliefs indicative of 
radicalization at a higher rate than non-college educated Muslims. 
OR 
P1b) Muslims enrolled in higher education will hold beliefs indicative of 
radicalization at a higher rate than college-aged Muslims who are not in 
college. 
Since higher levels of educational attainment predict lower levels of 
radicalization, P1a cannot hold. The analyses show that completing higher 
education does not result in higher levels of radicalization, but in fact decreases 
levels of radicalization across all three measures of radicalization. P1b also fails to 
hold, since none of the methods used showed any relationship between current 
higher education enrollment status and radicalization. As long as age and 
attainment level are held constant, analyses show that enrollment status is not a 
significant predictor of radicalization. 
Although not directly related to either sub-premise, age was included in all 
analyses in order to further refute the original premise. Those individuals who 
are of the age traditionally found in higher education (18-29) have been shown to 
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have higher rates of radicalization according to these analyses, but that it due to 
their age, not their enrollment status. In other words, Muslim youth, many of 
whom participate in higher education, do have higher rates of radicalization, but 
this is not related to their higher education participation. 
The statistics from the UK paint a similar picture.  The Centre for Social 
Cohesion along with YouGov (Thorne & Stuart, 2008) performed a survey of 
students across the UK, specifically to measure the attitudes of Muslim students.  
This data shows, that like their American counterparts, Muslim youth are more 
likely to support radical ideas than both the general Muslim population and the 
general population.  The relevant question for the British study is not exactly the 
same as the suicide bomber question from the Pew Research Center’s survey of 
American Muslims, but it is similar enough: “Is it ever justifiable to kill in the 
name of religion?” Responses that will indicate radical views, for my purposes, 
are, “Yes, in order to preserve and promote that religion.” And, “Yes, but only if 
that religion is under attack” (p. 43).  Questions from both the Pew Research 
Center (PRC) and Centre for Social Cohesion/YouGov (CSC) studies are broad in 
terms of types of violence (PRC: “suicide bombing and other forms of violence” 
vs. CSC: “killing”) as well as motivation (PRC: “defend Islam from its enemies” 
vs. CSC: “to preserve and promote” and “if that religion is under attack”). 
A third of Muslim students in the UK (32%) responded positively to this 
question, compared to 2% of non-Muslim students.  This is roughly the same as 
the Pew Research Center’s reported rate of support among college-aged Muslim 
youth (18-29) in the UK of 35%.  Based on these findings alone, it appears as if 
  
 44 
extremist views are more a factor of youth than anything happening in higher 
education. 
Since both sub-premises fail in both the American and British contexts, 
the primary hypothesis does not hold. Thus, the following is not proven: 
P1: The environment at institutions of higher education contributes to the 
radicalization of Muslim youth. 
 
Discussion 
So, to return to the original research question: Why do terrorists have a 
higher rate of university participation than the general population? One 
possibility is that terrorist recruiters have such a large pool of potential recruits 
that they can be selective, and that they choose candidates most likely to be 
successful. It should then be no surprise that college-educated individuals, 
especially those with backgrounds in technical fields, would be viewed as 
preferable to those without the same level and type of education. 
However, it is not clear that the recruit pool is actually that large. Many 
researchers (Berribi, 2007; Jenkins, 2007; Atran, 2008; Brachman, 2010) 
actually argue the opposite - that there is a limited supply of individuals who are 
genuinely willing to actively participate in terrorist activities. There are many 
“jihobbyists,” but fewer jihadists. Furthermore, many of those who do take the 
step toward action were not recruited in the traditional sense at all, and therefore 
could not be selected or screened out by discerning recruiters.  
Although I have shown that university participation does not increase the 
rates of radicalization, it is my belief that the university can play an important 
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role in catalyzing radicalization into radical action. Youth enrolled in universities 
may have radical desires as the same rate as youth not enrolled in universities, 
but I argue that those who participate in the university are more likely to have 
greater access and more frequent contact with like-minded individuals, and as 
shown, this is a significant component of turning radical desires into reality. 
Therefore, universities are not involved in radical Islamist terrorism as 
birthplaces of radical ideas, but they can provide important meeting places for 
those who hold those ideas. 
The role of student Islamic societies in promoting radicalization has been 
the central focus of many journalists in the UK.  Not only are the members of 
these societies shown to have higher rates of radicalization, they are viewed as 
prime recruiting grounds for more radical groups not affiliated with the 
university and ultimately for terrorist organizations (Glees & Pope, 2005).  
Certainly these organizations are self-selecting and self-reinforcing, in that they 
likely have a reputation for radicalism and appeal to those with radical 
tendencies, thus strengthening their reputation.  Their possible connections to 
outside organizations and their activities on campus have warranted the most 
attention from university administrators, security experts, and the press.  
However, the extent of these groups and their influence, and the methods by 
which they operate, are understudied. 
 
Limitations 
Both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of this project suffer from a 
reliance on secondary data. Although the data is of a high quality, none of it has 
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been gathered specifically for this kind of analysis. This manifests itself in 
multiple ways. For the quantitative data, the analysis of the situation in the 
United Kingdom suffers because of a reliance on two separate surveys. The 
YouGov/CSC study only provides data for students in the UK, while a separate 
Pew Research Center study is necessary to compare the student results to the 
general population. In both cases, this project also relies on reported, “cooked” 
data - as the raw data is not available for more customized analysis. 
In the case of the data from the United States, the Pew Research Center 
has released the raw data of its survey of American Muslims which allows for 
more sophisticated analysis. It also allows a comparison between Muslim higher 
education students and the general population from the same dataset. However, 
when comparing results between the US and the UK, I was forced to rely on 
datasets that do not use the same sampling method or the same instrument. This 
is clearly evident when creating the variable for support for violence, a measure of 
radical beliefs. The YouGov/CSC survey and Pew survey use questions that are 
similar, but not the same, and their methodologies are different. 
Finally, although I have an insider’s prospective on higher education in the 
West, this project focuses on individuals that are outsiders. Despite my research 
into the topic, I have not actually experienced higher education as an outsider. I 
do not have first-hand experience in the outsider experience in general or the 
Muslim experience in particular. I do acknowledge this limitation, and this 
project is intended to be valuable to those who are also intimately involved with 
higher education but who must deal with individuals who are outsiders. 
Regardless, a lack of familiarity with the Muslim experience in particular, but 
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also a general outsider’s perspective on whatever marginalized group is in 
question, is an acknowledged limitation for terrorism studies. To account for this, 
I do not attempt to claim that this research was objective, or hide behind 
supposed objectivity of quantitative data and statistics. Instead, I acknowledge 
the presence of subjectivity that is true of all social research. Taking inspiration 
from Beachum, McCray, and Huang (2010), I aspire to interpretations that, while 
subjective, are “tempered with understanding, research rigor, and socio-historical 
insight.” 
 
Conclusion 
This project has shown that universities do not contribute to the 
radicalization of Muslim youth, yet radicalization is not a topic that they can 
ignore. Using a quantitative analysis of the Pew Research Center Muslims in 
America Survey (2007) I have shown that the assumption by many that 
universities contribute to radicalization is not true. What this means is that 
university participation is not correlated with radicalization, and that universities 
do not contribute to radicalization. However, youth is strongly correlated with 
radicalization, and college-aged youth are the prime age bracket for radicalization 
and recruitment. Furthermore, any site where large numbers of youth gather, 
especially those that feel marginalized, is a potential site of radicalization.  
I would like to stress again that such a phenomenon is true regardless of 
the content or participants of that radicalization. This is important to remember 
for two reasons. The first is that it has long been known, accepted, and sometimes 
encouraged the idea that universities are sites where radical ideas flourish. Thus 
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it should not be surprising when radical Islam rears its head as well. Likewise, 
while I acknowledge that universities are sites of radicalization, it should not then 
be concluded that universities are the birthplace of these ideas. 
The second reason follows from this: it is essential to counter-
radicalization efforts that Muslim youth not be further marginalized through 
demonization. Part of the ideal university experience is to flirt with radical ideas, 
and seeking to persecute radical Islam while allowing radical Leftist, Christian, or 
National movements is both discriminatory and counterproductive. As Neumann 
(2011) said before Congress,  
“One of the greatest obstacles to introducing counter- radicalization to the 
United States is the word “radical.” Not only is being a radical no crime in 
America, the very idea of “radicalism” has positive connotations in a 
nation whose founding principles were seen as radical, even revolutionary, 
at the time.” (2011) 
  
 I believe that educators are responsible for maintaining an inclusive 
learning environment that tolerates radicalism while simultaneously being 
critical of violent extremism. Educators should continue this role, and its 
importance in combatting extremist narratives should be emphasized, but this is 
a role that educators should play regardless of the students in their class and the 
current status of the War on Terror. It is the mission of the Western university to 
maintain an inclusive, tolerant environment, and that mission just so happens to 
align with one of the best strategies in combatting terrorism. But educators 
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should leverage that alignment themselves in order to prevent their mission from 
being subverted by the national security apparatus. 
Finally, I hope that this project has shown the vital role that educators can 
and must play in the years ahead. Not only are educators important stakeholders 
in higher education, but they are often the best positioned and best equipped to 
combat radicalizing influences. Educators must not ignore the problem, or 
pretend that it is not within their purview. Higher educational faculty and 
administrators must engage with the research and be prepared to face the 
problem head on. They should do this not only because they are the best 
positioned and best equipped, but also because if they do not take charge, then 
the national security apparatus will be ready to step in. 
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Appendix A 
 
The following are the variables from the 2007 Pew Research Center Study that 
comprise both the composite score dependent variable and the variables of the 
factor analysis. Bolded responses are those that I chose to count as a “positive” 
response, or a response indicating one of Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman’s 
manifestations of radicalization, for the purposes of the composite score variable 
in Method 2 of the quantitative analysis. 
 
Adopting a Legalistic Interpretation of Islam 
 
Q.B2d Here are a few pairs of statements. For each pair, tell me whether the 
FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own views — 
even if neither is exactly right. 
• • Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society 
[OR] 
• • Homosexuality is a way of life that should be discouraged 
by society 
• • Neither/Both equally (VOL.) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.E1 On average, how often do you attend the mosque or Islamic center for salah 
and Jum’ah prayer? 
• • More than once a week 
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• • Once a week for Jum’ah prayer 
• • Once or twice a month 
• • A few times a year, especially for the Eid 
• • Seldom 
• • Never 
• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.E4 Which comes closest to your view? [READ, IN ORDER] 
IF BELIEVE KORAN IS WORD OF GOD (Q.E4=1), ASK: 
Q.E5 And would you say that [READ, IN ORDER]? 
• • The Koran is the word of God, (NET) 
• o The Koran is to be taken literally, word for word, 
• o That not everything in the Koran should be taken literally, 
word for word. 
• o Other/Don’t know/Refused (VOL. DO NOT READ) 
• • The Koran is a book written by men and is not the word of 
God (NET) 
• • Other (VOL. DO NOT READ) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL. DO NOT READ) 
 
Q.E6 Concerning daily salah or prayer, do you, in general, pray all five salah 
daily, make 
some of the five salah daily, occasionally make salah, only make Eid prayers, or 
do you 
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never pray? 
• • Pray daily (NET) 
• • Pray all five salah 
• • Make some of the five salah daily 
• • Occasionally make salah 
• • Only make Eid prayers 
• • Never pray 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.G3 When men and women pray in a mosque, do you think that  
• • Women should be separate from men, in another 
area of the mosque or behind a curtain 
• • Women should pray behind men, with no curtain  
• • Women should pray in an area alongside men, with no 
curtain 
• • Other (VOL.) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Trusting Only Select Religious Authorities 
 
Q.D2 How many of your close friends are Muslims? 
• • All of them 
• • Most of them 
• • Some of them, or 
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• • Hardly any of them 
• • None of them (VOL.) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Perceived Schism Between Islam and the West 
 
Q.C1 Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in 
using military force in 
Afghanistan? 
• • Right decision 
• • Wrong decision 
• • Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.C2 Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in 
using military force against Iraq? 
• • Right decision 
• • Wrong decision 
• • Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.D4 Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and 
living in a modern 
society, or don’t you think so? 
• • Yes, there is a conflict 
• • No, don’t think so 
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• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.D5 Which comes closer to your view? 
• • Muslims coming to the U.S. today should mostly adopt 
American customs and ways of life 
• • Muslims coming to the U.S. today should mostly try 
to remain distinct from the larger American society 
• • Both (VOL.) 
• • Neither (VOL.) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.E12 Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? 
• • American  
• • Muslim 
• • Both equally (VOL.) 
• • Neither/Other (VOL.) 
• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
 
Low Tolerance for Perceived Theological Deviance 
 
Q.E3 How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat 
important, not too important, 
or not at all important? 
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• • Very important 
• • Somewhat important 
• • Not too important 
• • Not at all important 
• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.E9 Which statement comes closest to your view?  
• • There is only ONE true way to interpret the 
teachings of Islam, 
• • There is MORE than one true way to interpret the teachings 
of Islam 
• • Other (VOL.) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.D7 Do you personally think it is okay or not okay for a Muslim to marry 
someone who is not a 
Muslim?  
• • Okay for a Muslim to marry someone who is not a Muslim 
• • Not okay for a Muslim to marry someone who is not 
a Muslim 
• • Depends (VOL.) 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others 
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Q.E8 In your opinion, should mosques keep out of political matters – or should 
they express their views 
on day-to-day social and political questions? 
• • Should keep out 
• • Should express views 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.G1 Overall, do you think that the quality of life for Muslim women in the U.S. 
is better, worse, or 
about the same as the quality of life for women in most Muslim countries? 
• • Better 
• • Worse 
• • About the same 
• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Political Radicalization 
 
Q.F1 How concerned, if at all, are you about the rise of Islamic extremism 
around the WORLD these days? Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, 
not too concerned or not at all concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism 
around the world these days? 
• • Very concerned 
• • Somewhat concerned 
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• • Not too concerned 
• • Not at all concerned 
• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.H1 Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence 
against civilian targets are 
justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no 
matter what the 
reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this 
kind of violence is 
often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never 
justified? 
• • Often justified 
• • Sometimes justified 
• • Rarely justified 
• • Never justified 
• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.H4 Do you think the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce 
international terrorism or 
don’t you believe that? 
• • Sincere effort 
• • Don’t believe that 
• • Both (VOL.) 
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• • DK/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.H4a And which statement comes closest to your opinion? 
• • A way can be found for the state of Israel to exist so that the 
rights and needs of the Palestinian people are taken care of 
• • The rights and needs of the Palestinian people 
cannot be taken care of as long as the state of Israel exists 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
Q.H5 Overall, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Al Qaeda?  
• • Very favorable 
• • Somewhat favorable 
• • Somewhat unfavorable 
• • Very unfavorable 
• • Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
  
  
 65 
Vita 
 
F. Brandon LaRue was born in Huntsville, AL, where he later attended the University of Alabama 
in Huntsville and earned a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Philosophy with a minor in 
Global Studies. After a short-lived career as a professional philosopher, he returned to academia 
at Lehigh University to study Comparative and International Education, earning a Master of Arts. 
He currently lives in New York City and is pursuing a career in international higher education and 
quantitative research. His research focus areas are security studies, international relations, higher 
education, and education policy. 
